



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

5 June 1965

The Honorable Robert S. McMemore The Secretary of Defense The Department of Defense

Dear Mr. Secretary:

In accordance with your request of 27 May, the intelligence community has prepared, and I transmit herewith Special National Intelligence Estimate 10-6-65, which discusses probable Communist reactions to the employment of B-50s in attacks on EAM sites and the jet aircraft deployed at airfields in the Manoi-Haiphong area. Also enclosed are two related estimate:

SNIE 10-6/1-65, which discusses Communist and non-Communist reactions to possible B-52 strikes on enemy positions within South Vietnam, and SNIE 10-7-65, which discusses probable Communist reactions should the 15 decides not to attack the SAMs and jet aircraft on the airfields mentioned above.

These three papers have been approved by the members of the United States Intelligence Deard, though the State Department comber discents from paragraph 3 and the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, from paragraphs 4 and 12 of SWIE 10-5-55.

evidence concerning the support furnished to the DEV by the USBE and Communist China, the conclusions that these actions suggest as to Communist capabilities and intentions, and the implications of all this for Unpolicy.

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